DBRS Morningstar Finalises Provisional Ratings on Dutch Property Finance 2020-2 B.V.

DBRS Ratings Limited (DBRS Morningstar) finalised its provisional ratings on the notes issued by Dutch Property Finance 2020-2 B.V. (DPF 2020-2 or the Issuer) as follows:

-- Class A Notes at AAA (sf)
-- Class B Notes at AA (high) (sf)
-- Class C Notes at A (high) (sf)
-- Class D Notes at BBB (sf)
-- Class E Notes at BBB (low) (sf)

The rating assigned to the Class A notes addresses the timely payment of interest and the ultimate repayment of principal by the legal final maturity date in January 2058. The ratings on the Class B to Class E notes address the ultimate payment of interest and repayment of principal by the legal final maturity date. In addition, the Class B to Class E notes will be rated for the timely payment of interest once they are the most-senior class outstanding. An increased margin on all the rated notes is payable from the first optional redemption date in April 2025. DBRS Morningstar does not rate the Class F or Class G notes.

The Issuer is a bankruptcy-remote special-purpose vehicle incorporated in the Netherlands. The issued notes funded the purchase of Dutch mortgages receivables originated or acquired by RNHB. Proceeds of the Class G notes funded the general reserve fund.

RNHB is a buy-to-let and mid-market real estate lending business in the Netherlands. It was formed in 2008 when Rijnlandse Hypotheekbank and Nederlandse Hypotheekbank were merged by their then-parent company, FGH Bank N.V., which in turn was owned by Rabobank. In December 2016, RNHB and its loans were acquired by a consortium of (1) funds managed by CarVal Investors LLC (CarVal) and (2) Arrow Global Group Plc (Arrow, AGG), with CarVal holding the majority interest. The mortgage portfolio will be serviced by Vesting Finance Servicing B.V. with Intertrust Administrative Services B.V. appointed as a replacement servicer facilitator.

As of 31 August 2020, the portfolio consisted of 982 loans with a total portfolio balance (net of construction deposits) of approximately EUR 317.6 million. The weighted-average (WA) seasoning of the portfolio is 0.7 years with a WA remaining term of 4.1 years. The WA current loan-to-value is comparatively low for a Dutch portfolio at 65.1%. Nearly all of the loans included in the portfolio are fixed with future resets (99.9%) while the notes pay a floating rate of interest. To address this interest rate mismatch, the transaction is structured with a fixed-to-float interest rate swap that swaps the fixed interest rate received from the assets for a three-month Euribor. Approximately 0.41% of the portfolio comprises loans where the borrowers are in early stage arrears. There are no loans in arrears greater than three months.

Until April 2025, the seller has the ability to grant, and the Issuer the obligation to purchase, further advances—subject to the adherence of asset conditions and available principal funds. The transaction documents specify criteria that must be complied with during this period in order for the further advances to be sold to the Issuer. DBRS Morningstar stressed the portfolio in accordance with the asset conditions to assess the portfolio’s worst-case scenario.

Credit enhancement for the Class A notes is calculated as 19.3% and is provided by the subordination of the Class B notes to the Class F notes and the general reserve fund. Credit enhancement for the Class B notes is calculated as 15.7% and is provided by the subordination of the Class C notes to the Class F notes and the general reserve fund. Credit enhancement for the Class C notes is calculated as 11.8% and is provided by the subordination of the Class D notes to the Class F notes and the general reserve fund. Credit enhancement for the Class D notes is calculated as 6.5% and is provided by the subordination of the Class E notes, Class F notes, and the general reserve fund. Credit enhancement for the Class E notes is calculated as 5.0% and is provided by the subordination of the Class F notes and the general reserve fund.

The transaction benefits from a nonamortising cash reserve that is available to support the Class A to Class E notes. At closing, the cash reserve was funded at 2.0% of the initial balance of the Class A to the Class F notes. Additionally, the notes will be provided with liquidity support from principal receipts, which can be used to cover interest shortfalls on the most-senior class of notes, provided a credit is applied to the principal deficiency ledgers, in reverse sequential order.

The Issuer has entered into a fixed to floating interest rate swap with NatWest Markets plc (long term Issuer rating of BBB (high) with a long term critical obligations rating of “A” both with Stable trend by DBRS Morningstar) to mitigate the fixed interest rate risk from the mortgage loans and the three-month Euribor payable on the notes. The swap documents reflect DBRS Morningstar’s “Derivative Criteria for European Structured Finance Transactions” methodology.

The Issuer Account Bank and Paying Agent is Elavon Financial Services DAC. Based on the DBRS Morningstar private rating of Elavon Financial Services DAC, the downgrade provisions outlined in the transaction documents, and other mitigating factors inherent in the transaction structure, DBRS Morningstar considers the risk arising from the exposure to the account bank to be consistent with the rating assigned to the Notes, as described in DBRS Morningstar’s "Legal Criteria for European Structured Finance Transactions" methodology.

The rating of the Class A notes addresses the timely payment of interest and ultimate payment of principal on or before the legal final maturity date; the ratings of the Class B notes to the Class E notes address the timely payment of interest once they are the most-senior class and the ultimate payment of principal on or before the legal final maturity date.

DBRS Morningstar based its ratings primarily on the following:

-- The transaction capital structure, form, and sufficiency of available credit enhancement and liquidity provisions.
-- The credit quality of the mortgage loan portfolio and the ability of the servicer to perform collection activities. DBRS Morningstar calculated portfolio default rates (PDRs), loss given default (LGD), and expected loss (EL) outputs on the mortgage loan portfolio.
-- The ability of the transaction to withstand stressed cash flow assumptions and repay the notes according to the terms of the transaction documents. The transaction cash flows were analysed using PDRs and LGD outputs provided by DBRS Morningstar’s European RMBS Insight Model. Transaction cash flows were analysed using Intex DealMaker.
-- The structural mitigants in place to avoid potential payment disruptions caused by operational risk, such as downgrade and replacement language in the transaction documents.
-- The transaction’s ability to withstand stressed cash flow assumptions and repay investors in accordance with the terms and conditions of the notes.
-- The consistency of the transaction’s legal structure with DBRS Morningstar’s “Legal Criteria for European Structured Finance Transactions” methodology and the presence of legal opinions addressing the assignment of the assets to the Issuer.

The Coronavirus Disease (COVID-19) and the resulting isolation measures have caused an economic contraction, leading to sharp increases in unemployment rates and income reductions for many borrowers. DBRS Morningstar anticipates that payment holidays and delinquencies may arise in the coming months for many RMBS transactions, some meaningfully. The ratings are based on additional analysis and adjustments to expected performance as a result of the global efforts to contain the spread of the coronavirus. For this transaction, DBRS Morningstar assumed that there was a moderate decline in residential property prices.

On 16 April 2020, the DBRS Morningstar Sovereign group released a set of macroeconomic scenarios for the 2020-22 period in select economies. These scenarios were updated on 10 September 2020. For details, see the following commentaries: https://www.dbrsmorningstar.com/research/366542/global-macroeconomic-scenarios-september-update and https://www.dbrsmorningstar.com/research/359903/global-macroeconomic-scenarios-application-to-credit-ratings. The DBRS Morningstar analysis considered impacts consistent with the moderate scenario in the referenced reports.

On 5 May 2020, DBRS Morningstar published a commentary outlining how the coronavirus crisis is likely to affect the DBRS Morningstar-rated RMBS transactions in Europe. For more details, please see: https://www.dbrsmorningstar.com/research/360599/european-rmbs-transactions-risk-exposure-to-coronavirus-covid-19-effect and https://www.dbrsmorningstar.com/research/362712/european-structured-finance-covid-19-credit-risk-exposure-roadmap.

For more information regarding rating methodologies and Coronavirus Disease (COVID-19), please see the following DBRS Morningstar press release: https://www.dbrsmorningstar.com/research/357883.

For more information regarding structured finance rating methodologies and Coronavirus Disease (COVID-19), please see the following DBRS Morningstar press release: https://www.dbrsmorningstar.com/research/358308.

ESG CONSIDERATIONS
A description of how DBRS Morningstar considers ESG factors within the DBRS Morningstar analytical framework and its methodologies can be found at: https://www.dbrsmorningstar.com/research/357792.

Notes:
All figures are in euros unless otherwise noted.

The principal methodologies applicable to the ratings are “European RMBS Insight Methodology” (2 April 2020) and “European RMBS Insight: Dutch Addendum” (13 March 2020).

DBRS Morningstar has applied the principal methodologies consistently and conducted a review of the transaction in accordance with the principal methodologies.

Other methodologies referenced in this transaction are listed at the end of this press release.

These may be found at: https://www.dbrsmorningstar.com/about/methodologies.

For a more detailed discussion of the sovereign risk impact on Structured Finance ratings, please refer to “Appendix C: The Impact of Sovereign Ratings on Other DBRS Morningstar Credit Ratings” of the “Global Methodology for Rating Sovereign Governments” at: https://www.dbrsmorningstar.com/research/364527/global-methodology-for-rating-sovereign-governments.

The sources of data and information used for these ratings include CarVal Investors LLC, RNHB B.V., HSBC Bank plc, and their agents. DBRS Morningstar was provided with loan-level data as of 30 June 2020 and historical performance data (delinquency, cumulative default, cumulative loss and prepayment data), from August 2011 to June 2020.

DBRS Morningstar did not rely upon third-party due diligence in order to conduct its analysis.

DBRS Morningstar was supplied with third party assessments. However, this did not impact the rating analysis.

DBRS Morningstar considers the data and information available to it for the purposes of providing these ratings to be of satisfactory quality.

DBRS Morningstar does not audit or independently verify the data or information it receives in connection with the rating process.

These ratings concern a newly issued financial instrument. These are the first DBRS Morningstar ratings on these financial instruments.

This is the first rating action since the Initial Rating Date.

Information regarding DBRS Morningstar ratings, including definitions, policies, and methodologies, is available on www.dbrsmorningstar.com.

To assess the impact of changing the transaction parameters on the ratings, DBRS Morningstar considered the following stress scenarios, as compared to the parameters used to determine the ratings (the Base Case):

-- In respect of the Class A Notes, a PDR of 32.1% and LGD of 47.5%, corresponding to the AAA (sf) rating scenario, was stressed assuming a 25% and 50% increase in the PD and LGD.
-- In respect of the Class B Notes, a PDR of 30.3% and LGD of 45.1%, corresponding to the AA (high) (sf) rating scenario, was stressed assuming a 25% and 50% increase in the PD and LGD.
-- In respect of the Class C Notes, a PDR of 26.1% and LGD of 37.9%, corresponding to the A (high) (sf) rating scenario, was stressed assuming a 25% and 50% increase in the PD and LGD.
-- In respect of the Class D Notes, a PDR of 19.5% and LGD of 22.0%, corresponding to the BBB (sf) rating scenario, was stressed assuming a 25% and 50% increase in the PD and LGD.
-- In respect of the Class E Notes, a PDR of 17.8% and LGD of 18.1%, corresponding to the BBB (low) (sf) rating scenario, was stressed assuming a 25% and 50% increase in the PD and LGD.

DBRS Morningstar concludes the following impact on the Class A notes:
-- 25% increase of the PDR, ceteris paribus would not lead to a downgrade to AA (high) (sf);
-- 50% increase of the PDR, ceteris paribus would lead to a downgrade to AA (low) (sf);
-- 25% increase of the LGD, ceteris paribus would not lead to a downgrade to AA (high) (sf);
-- 50% increase of the LGD, ceteris paribus would lead to a downgrade to AA (low) (sf);
-- 25% increase of the PDR and 25% increase of the LGD, ceteris paribus would lead to a downgrade to AA (low) (sf);
-- 50% increase of the PDR and 25% increase of the LGD, ceteris paribus would lead to a downgrade to A (sf);
-- 25% increase of the PDR and 50% increase of the LGD, ceteris paribus would lead to a downgrade to A (high) (sf);
-- 50% increase of the PDR and 50% increase of the LGD, ceteris paribus would lead to a downgrade to A (low) (sf).

DBRS Morningstar concludes the following impact on the Class B notes:
-- 25% increase of the PDR, ceteris paribus would lead to a downgrade to A (high) (sf);
-- 50% increase of the PDR, ceteris paribus would lead to a downgrade to A (sf);
-- 25% increase of the LGD, ceteris paribus would lead to a downgrade to AA (low) (sf);
-- 50% increase of the LGD, ceteris paribus would lead to a downgrade to A (high)(sf);
-- 25% increase of the PDR and 25% increase of the LGD, ceteris paribus would lead to a downgrade to A (sf);
-- 50% increase of the PDR and 25% increase of the LGD, ceteris paribus would lead to a downgrade to A (low) (sf);
-- 25% increase of the PDR and 50% increase of the LGD, ceteris paribus would lead to a downgrade to A (low) (sf);
-- 50% increase of the PDR and 50% increase of the LGD, ceteris paribus would lead to a downgrade to BBB (high) (sf).

DBRS Morningstar concludes the following impact on the Class C notes:
-- 25% increase of the PDR, ceteris paribus would lead to a downgrade to A (low) (sf);
-- 50% increase of the PDR, ceteris paribus would lead to a downgrade to BBB (high) (sf);
-- 25% increase of the LGD, ceteris paribus would lead to a downgrade to A (low) (sf);
-- 50% increase of the LGD, ceteris paribus would lead to a downgrade to A (low) (sf);
-- 25% increase of the PDR and 25% increase of the LGD, ceteris paribus would lead to a downgrade to BBB (high) (sf);
-- 50% increase of the PDR and 25% increase of the LGD, ceteris paribus would lead to a downgrade to BBB (high) (sf);
-- 25% increase of the PDR and 50% increase of the LGD, ceteris paribus would lead to a downgrade to BBB (high) (sf);
-- 50% increase of the PDR and 50% increase of the LGD, ceteris paribus would lead to a downgrade to BBB (sf).

DBRS Morningstar concludes the following impact on the Class D notes:
-- 25% increase of the PDR, ceteris paribus would lead to a downgrade to BBB (low) (sf);
-- 50% increase of the PDR, ceteris paribus would lead to a downgrade to BBB (low) (sf);
-- 25% increase of the LGD, ceteris paribus would lead to a downgrade to BBB (sf);
-- 50% increase of the LGD, ceteris paribus would lead to a downgrade to BBB (low) (sf);
-- 25% increase of the PDR and 25% increase of the LGD, ceteris paribus would lead to a downgrade to BBB (low) (sf);
-- 50% increase of the PDR and 25% increase of the LGD, ceteris paribus would lead to a downgrade to BB (high) (sf);
-- 25% increase of the PDR and 50% increase of the LGD, ceteris paribus would lead to a downgrade to BB (high) (sf);
-- 50% increase of the PDR and 50% increase of the LGD, ceteris paribus would lead to a downgrade to BB (high) (sf).

DBRS Morningstar concludes the following impact on the Class E notes:
-- 25% increase of the PDR, ceteris paribus would lead to a downgrade to BB (high) (sf);
-- 50% increase of the PDR, ceteris paribus would lead to a downgrade to BB (high) (sf);
-- 25% increase of the LGD, ceteris paribus would lead to a downgrade to BBB (low) (sf);
-- 50% increase of the LGD, ceteris paribus would lead to a downgrade to BB (high) (sf);
-- 25% increase of the PDR and 25% increase of the LGD, ceteris paribus would lead to a downgrade to BB (high) (sf);
-- 50% increase of the PDR and 25% increase of the LGD, ceteris paribus would lead to a downgrade to BB (sf);
-- 25% increase of the PDR and 50% increase of the LGD, ceteris paribus would lead to a downgrade to BB (sf);
-- 50% increase of the PDR and 50% increase of the LGD, ceteris paribus would lead to a downgrade to BB (low) (sf).

For further information on DBRS Morningstar historical default rates published by the European Securities and Markets Authority (ESMA) in a central repository, see: http://cerep.esma.europa.eu/cerep-web/statistics/defaults.xhtml.

Ratings assigned by DBRS Ratings Limited are subject to EU and U.S. regulations only.

Lead Analyst: Rehanna Sameja, Senior Vice President
Rating Committee Chair: Ketan Thaker, Managing Director
Initial Rating Date: 8 September 2020

DBRS Ratings Limited
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Registered in England and Wales: No. 7139960

The rating methodologies used in the analysis of this transaction can be found at: https://www.dbrsmorningstar.com/about/methodologies.

-- European RMBS Insight Methodology (2 April 2020) and European RMBS Insight Model v. 4.3.1.0., https://www.dbrsmorningstar.com/research/359192/european-rmbs-insight-methodology.
-- European RMBS Insight: Dutch Addendum (13 March 2020),
https://www.dbrsmorningstar.com/research/357926/european-rmbs-insight-dutch-addendum
-- European CMBS Rating and Surveillance Methodology (13 December 2019),
https://www.dbrsmorningstar.com/research/354637/european-cmbs-rating-and-surveillance-methodology.
-- Legal Criteria for European Structured Finance Transactions (11 September 2019), https://www.dbrsmorningstar.com/research/350234/legal-criteria-for-european-structured-finance-transactions.
-- Interest Rate Stresses for European Structured Finance Transactions (28 September 2020), https://www.dbrsmorningstar.com/research/367292/interest-rate-stresses-for-european-structured-finance-transactions.
-- Derivative Criteria for European Structured Finance Transactions (24 September 2020),
https://www.dbrsmorningstar.com/research/367092/derivative-criteria-for-european-structured-finance-transactions.
-- Operational Risk Assessment for European Structured Finance Servicers (28 February 2020), https://www.dbrsmorningstar.com/research/357429/operational-risk-assessment-for-european-structured-finance-servicers.
-- Operational Risk Assessment for European Structured Finance Originators (28 February 2020), https://www.dbrsmorningstar.com/research/357430/operational-risk-assessment-for-european-structured-finance-originators.

A description of how DBRS Morningstar analyses structured finance transactions and how the methodologies are collectively applied can be found at: https://www.dbrsmorningstar.com/research/278375.

For more information on this credit or on this industry, visit www.dbrsmorningstar.com or contact us at [email protected].

This press release was amended on 7 January 2021 to remove “Rating European Consumer and Commercial Asset-Backed Securitisations” (3 September 2020) and add “European CMBS Rating and Surveillance Methodology" (13 December 2019) to the list of methodologies used.